THE ONTIC IN-SELF

INDIVIDUATION AND PERSON IN ONTOPSYCHOLOGY

Abstract

Dealing with the notion of person is going directly to the core of the problem of identity. The current perspective marked by the ideal of “post-modernity” seems to bring up this issue in the midst of the social context in which we find ourselves, which allows attributing to identity, whether as a subjective experience, or as a philosophical discourse, innumerable meanings. Thus, the problem exposed in this essay aims to point to the perspective developed by Antonio Meneghetti in his vast bibliography and in the empirical practice of Ontopsychology, a movement he founded in Italy at the end of the sixties. What immediately emerges is that Ontopsychology responds to the universal problem of the notion of subject through the notion of person, expressed, from the Aristotelian tradition, in the singular category of individuation: the ontic In-Self. This, in turn, is the epistemic criterion of the operability of the Ontopsychological School.